Don’t Blame Ukraine for Weapons Shortfall

Operations in and around Iran this year have burned through 23% of the U.S. military’s entire JASSM inventory, 27% of the TLAM inventory, 33% of the SM-6 interceptor inventory, 50% of the SM-3 interceptor inventory, 64% of the Patriot interceptor inventory, and 80% of the THAAD interceptor inventory. The on-again-off-again U.S. strikes and the apparent curtailing of CENTCOM’s plans can be traced to these alarming statistics. 

 

Some blame the weapons shortfall on military assistance delivered to Ukraine. But playing the blame game by scapegoating Ukraine misses the mark—and won’t solve the problem. 

 

Stats
“A lot of those munitions and a lot of those capabilities were sent to Ukraine under the previous administration,” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reports. 

 

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz adds that the Trump administration “inherited a depleted situation from not only Ukraine, but also the ongoing fight with the Houthis under the Biden administration and a depleted military under the Biden administration.”

Yet the U.S. has sent Ukraine precisely zero THAAD systems (an air-defense missile designed to intercept threats at high-altitude); zero TLAMs (a long-range land-attack missile generally launched from ships); zero JASSMs (a standoff air-to-ground missile); zero SM-3s (a ship-based air-defense missile designed to intercept targets outside the earth’s atmosphere); and zero SM-6s (an air-defense missile generally deployed on ships and designed to intercept targets near their terminal phase).  

 

Those weapons systems, especially the air-defense systems, could certainly help Ukraine—43% of civilian casualties this spring were caused by Russia’s indiscriminate missile and drone salvos—but the U.S. hasn’t sent Ukraine any of them. CSIS reports that “The vast majority of items provided to Ukraine relate to ground combat.” 

 

Ukraine has indeed received about 600 Patriot interceptor missiles. However, as CSIS notes, that number comes with an important caveat: “Some Patriots were drawn from U.S. inventories. Others were newly manufactured under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.” Still others were “supplied by Europe.” As a result, “These deliveries did not reduce U.S. inventories.” 

 

Comparisons
The real problem with U.S. weapons stocks has little to do with Ukraine. Even before the wars in Ukraine and Iran, the arsenal of democracy was severely atrophied. 

 

A 2022 Pentagon report, for example, concluded that the defense industrial base (DIB) was disappearing. Pointing to the DIB’s “insufficient capacity,” the report noted that 90% of the military’s missiles come from just three sources.

 

The Commission on the National Defense Strategy ominously concluded in 2024 that “The U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.” The commission warned that the DIB “is unable to meet the equipment, technology, and munitions needs of the United States and its allies and partners,” presciently adding: “A protracted conflict, especially in multiple theaters, would require much greater capacity to produce, maintain, and replenish weapons and munitions.” And so, the commission urged policymakers “to surge munitions production.” Echoing the 2022 Pentagon report and foreshadowing the capacity conundrum exposed by the Iran War, the commission also cautioned, “Overly optimistic estimates for conflict to end quickly or to require fewer weapons, platforms, and munitions than are needed, given the strategic environment…will yield insufficient stockpiles.”

 

These assessments explain why, before the start of Operation Epic Fury, reports were leaked that CJCS Gen. Dan Caine “cautioned” the president “that shortfalls in critical munitions and a lack of support from allies will add significant risk to the operation and to U.S. personnel.” And that’s where the U.S. finds itself.

 

A shrunken DIB cannot produce high-tech weapons at the scale necessary to deter, let alone wage, sustained high-end combat, as we have learned during the Iran War. By way of example, the U.S. produces about 600 Patriot interceptors and less than a hundred THAAD interceptors per year. Whatever the size of the Patriot-THAAD interceptor magazine made available to CENTCOM before the war, Iran’s reservoir of far-cheaper one-way attack drones is obviously deeper. Another example of the DIB’s inadequate capability to deliver adequate capacity: A Pentagon program aims to acquire 340,000 one-way attack drones by 2028, while China is producing 12 million drones per year and Russia is deploying 6 million drones this year.

America’s allies and partners are helping replenish the arsenal of democracy—and could do more, if Washington could focus on teaming up rather than keeping score.

 

European and U.S. firms are partnering to double Patriot production. Ukraine will produce more than 7 million drones this year and has trailblazed the use of interceptor-drones. Japan has launched a crash program to develop homegrown interceptor-drones. Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Britain are fast-tracking co-development of inexpensive interceptor-drones. Israel has used lasers to neutralize drones in combat. Taiwan is shipping drones to allies in Europe. 

 

In short, free world allies and partners are assets, not liabilities. As President Truman declared early in Cold War I, “Free nations must stand together and help one another.” 

 

Choices
Helping Ukraine fight for its freedom has not harmed America’s security. In fact, by grinding down Putin’s army, assisting a democracy under attack and defending the principle that borders cannot be changed by force, military aid to Ukraine has helped America and the rest of free world. What President Reagan observed during Cold War I remains true in Cold War II: “Support for freedom fighters is self-defense” and “is tied to our own security.”

 

Moreover, neither Ukraine’s defenders nor U.S. efforts to help them are to blame for America’s shrunken weapons stockpile. 

 

America’s high-end munitions stocks are low because America’s defense industrial base is a shell of what it was before the fall of the Berlin Wall—and what it needs to be going forward. The 51 prime defense contractors that once served as the arsenal of democracy have been whittled down to five. Related, U.S. defense spending is too low given today’s metastasizing threats: Under the Trump and Biden administrations, the defense budget has hovered just above 3% of GDP. Even President Trump’s $1.15-trillion FY2027 baseline defense budget amounts to just 3.5% of GDP. The average during Cold War I was more than twice that. Congress and the president—and future Congresses and future presidents—must work together to make larger, more sustained investments in the armed forces. 

 

Even so, making larger investments in America’s military—while deepening cooperation with free world allies—is only half the solution. Making wise decisions on where, when and whether to unleash America’s military is the other half. President Reagan didn’t flinch from using military force when necessary, including against Iran. “Military strength,” he explained, “is absolutely essential for our protection and to preserve the peace.” But he emphasized, “it must always be an instrument of last resort.”

 

The Iran War, it pays to recall, wasn’t some exogenous event thrust upon America. This wasn’t December 7 or September 11. This was a war of choice—a defensible choice, given Iran’s past record and future plans—but a war of choice nonetheless. The prudent path would have been to choose to go to war only when weapons stocks were full—or to choose not to go to war at all.