Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

ASCF News

Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

Trump 2.0 Faces Cold War 2.0

Monday, December 30, 2024

Written by Alan W. Dowd, ASCF Senior Fellow

Categories: The Dowd Report

Comments: 0

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As the Free World braces for President Donald Trump’s second term, some are concerned about how he will handle the crises he’s inheriting in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the South China Sea; how he will manage the Western alliance system; and how he will deal with an emboldened axis of autocracy. These concerns are understandable because of some of the policies Trump pursued during his first term—policies these pages examined and critiqued throughout those four years.

However, alongside those concerns, there are indications that Trump 2.0 could borrow a page from the Reagan foreign-policy playbook and re-tool, re-posture and re-position America for Cold War 2.0.

Axis
Our discussion—and Trump 2.0’s approach to foreign and defense policy—must begin with this sobering reality: “The threats the United States faces are the most serious and most challenging the nation has encountered since 1945, and include the potential for near-term major war,” as the bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy recently declared.

The commission is not exaggerating. Russia is waging a war of extermination and expansion in Ukraine. Russia occupies parts of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; and props up tyrants in Europe, the Americas and Africa. China has absorbed Hong Kong; menaces, blockades and threatens to annex Taiwan; has attacked India; and is coercing the Philippines, militarizing islands in the South China Sea, tripling its nuclear arsenal and conducting a cyber-siege against the Free World. North Korea is sending ammunition and troops to aid Russia’s war on Ukraine. Iran supplies Moscow with kamikaze-drones, has launched waves of missiles at Israel, and has unleashed its hydra of terror proxies—Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah, Kata'ib Hezbollah—against U.S. troops, Free World allies and international shipping.

This axis of autocrats is not only trying to roll back the Free World; it is lighting the fuse for a global war. As NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte observes, “Danger is moving towards us at full speed.” Preventing the mutation and merging of the regional crises the Axis has triggered—Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine, Iran’s proxy war on Israel, China’s military coercion across the Indo-
Pacific, North Korea’s missile tests and troop deployments—into a much larger war will require clarity and capability on the part Free World. And that will require the leader of the Free World to lead.

Positives
That brings us back to Trump. Whether Trump likes it or not, the president of the United States is the leader of the Free World—and has carried that title and burden since 1941. And whether NATO,
the EU, the WTO or the G7 like it or not, Trump will return to the presidency on January 20, 2025.

Although his first-term pursuit of an America First foreign policy caused plenty of headaches, it pays to recall that Trump’s approach to the Middle East during his first term deprived Iran of economic resources and yielded a far more docile Islamic Republic; produced the Abraham Accordsthat led the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco to make peace with Israel; and punished Assad for using chemical weapons (thus enforcing the Obama administration’s “red line”).

In the Indo-Pacific, Trump leveled heavy tariffs against Beijing (tariffs the Biden administration kept in place); openly talked to Taiwan’s leader and even deployed troops and Navy ships to that embattled island democracy; and unleashed sanctions and rhetoric that opened the way to talks with North Korea’s leader. (Though the talks yielded nothing substantive, talks are preferable to war, and talks can be a pathway to understanding. As Churchill observed, “Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war.”)

Concerning Europe, although Trump’s comments about NATO were often critical and sometimes counterproductive, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg argued that Trump’s “actions speak louder than words.” Indeed, the record shows that Trump 1.0: approved a permanent base in Poland for U.S. combat troops (thus enhancing U.S.-NATO deterrence of Russia); authorized the chain of command in 2018 to engage Russian mercenaries as they bore down on U.S. stabilization forces based in Syria (Defense Secretary Jim Mattis explained in congressional testimony that the engagement “annihilated” hundreds of Russians); authorized U.S. Cyber Command to conduct paralyzing strikes on Russian entities ahead of the 2018 midterm elections; tripled his predecessor’s funding levels for the European Deterrence Initiative; reactivated the Navy’s Second Fleet (which was deactivated in 2011, after supporting NATO throughout the Cold War); re-established the Army’s V Corps (which was deactivated in 2012, after decades defending Europe); spurred several NATO members to make substantial investments in defense spending; reversed the policy of his predecessor and delivered lethal military aid to Ukraine; and oversaw the expansion of NATO, with the accession of Montenegro and North Macedonia.

Here at home, Trump during his first term made healthy investments in defense. He pushed for creating a military branch focused on defending U.S. interests and assets in space and cleared
away barriers to allow for increased production of U.S. oil and natural gas, thus strengthening the U.S. economy and denting Russia’s and Iran’s.

Negatives
As to the headaches of Trump’s first term—which raise understandable concerns overseas about his second—January 6 tops the list. The effects of that day and the weeks leading up to it were not confined within our borders, but rather rippled across the world.

January 6 gave the enemies of America fresh ammunition to use in the battle for hearts and minds now being waged between the Free World and a growing authoritarian bloc. Xi Jinping’s foreign ministry suggested “the beacon has fallen”—a backhand at America’s title of “beacon of democracy.” Russian officials yelped that “American democracy is limping.” A government-backed paper in Egypt—frontline state in the tug-of-war between liberal democracy and business-suit autocracy—saw in the January 6 siege “the sacrifice of American democracy…and the plummeting of the values it has ceaselessly tried to export around the world.”

“The United States has fallen to the level of Latin American countries,” a Brazilian newspaper jabbed, drawing a stinging comparison between the U.S. and a banana republic.

“After something like this,” President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine sighed, “it would be very difficult for the world to see the United States as a symbol of democracy.”

Trump 2.0 will have to deal with these headwinds overseas.

In addition, allies will be on edge given a range of issues. The undercutting and upbraiding of NATO during Trump’s first term. The leaked plans that Trump 2.0 could turn NATO into a two-tiered organization; the threats to pull out of NATO; the irresponsible comments encouraging Moscow “to do whatever the hell they want” to NATO members that don’t boost their defense budgets; the murky and mixed position on Taiwan; the tariffs he uncorked against allies during his first term and the threats for more tariffs against allies in the second.

Asterisks
Then again, allies can find solace in Trump’s meeting last month with Zelensky and President Emmanuel Macron of France. After the meeting, Trump mocked Russia’s “weakened state,” Zelensky thanked Trump for being “determined” to bring about “a just peace for Ukraine,” and Macron said the trio was committed to “joint efforts for peace” and “security.”

Trump and Rutte also met last month. Afterwards, Rutte reported that Trump wants “to make sure that the U.S. is not overspending…and he's right…since he became president, we spent $641 billion more than before he came on.”

In addition, Trump’s picks for Secretary of State (Sen. Marco Rubio) and National Security Advisor (Rep. Mike Waltz) signal a commitment to ongoing U.S. engagement with allies. Both men are considered China hawks, are committed to the NATO alliance and embrace a Reaganite foreign policy.

Rubio, for example, cosponsored legislation that bars any president from pulling the U.S. out of NATO. He described China as “the threat that will define this century." He introduced the Taiwan Peace through Strength Act to accelerate delivery of defensive weapons and technologies to Taiwan. He supported the transfer of airpower and other combat capabilities to Ukraine. He supports Israel’s war of self-defense and a hardline approach to Iran; and has pushed for increased defense spending.

Waltz, a former Green Beret who worked under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, has bluntly concluded, “We are in a cold war with the Chinese Communist Party.” He argues that “the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan contributed to Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.” He has criticized “naive attempts to engage Iran and prematurely ease sanctions.” He envisions using economic and military leverage against Moscow, including “lifting the pause on exports of liquified natural gas and cracking down on Russia’s illicit oil sales” and delivering “more weapons to Ukraine and fewer restrictions on their use.” And he wants Washington to “increase defense spending and revitalize the defense industrial base” to ensure that America’s armed forces “are clearly capable of denying a Chinese attack on Taiwan.”

Of course, as the world learned during Trump’s first White House stint, it is Trump—not his advisors—who will define and determine Trump administration foreign policy. Even so, the tools are here for a foreign policy that leverages America’s strengths to deter America’s enemies and defend America’s interests. The next issue will explore how Trump 2.0 can use those tools for maximum effect in Cold War 2.0.

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