Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

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Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

Pentagon struggles to add cybersecurity to weapon contracts, watchdog finds

Friday, March 5, 2021

Categories: ASCF News National Preparedness Cyber Security

Comments: 0

The U.S. Defense Department struggles to outline cybersecurity requirements in contracts for weapon systems, though the agency made important strides to improve those platforms’ cyber protections, a congressional watchdog announced Thursday.

A report on five major weapon platforms across the military services found better security measures than in 2018, when the Government Accountability Office’s last review said cybersecurity practices for the weapons were inadequate.

Still, the GAO found security gaps in the acquisition process, with three of five programs reviewed lacking any cybersecurity requirements in their contract awards. The Air Force was the only service with broad guidance to define cybersecurity requirements and incorporate them in contracts.

The findings come as the federal government grapples with the fallout from a security breach through an IT contractor that raised concerns about potential access to sensitive systems and possible supply chain security weaknesses.

The watchdog reviewed five weapons systems: a radar program, an anti-jammer, a ship, a ground vehicle and a missile. Four areas had improvement in the last three years. Programs reported that they had greater access to cyber expertise, completed more cyber assessments, used additional cybersecurity guidance, and improved tailoring of cyber requirements to mission needs.

“Officials from these acquisition programs reported having a greater focus on and more resources committed to cybersecurity in several areas, including greater access to cyber expertise and increased use of cyber assessments,” the report said.

Senior officials also noted progress with security controls and guidance.

“While it is too soon to determine whether these efforts will lead to more secure systems, they are further evidence of DOD’s commitment to improving weapon systems cybersecurity,” the report stated.

For the contract process, the GAO said the other military branches could benefit from an approach similar to the Air Force, outlining service-wide cybersecurity requirements for acquisitions.

The watchdog recommended the Army, Navy and Marines “develop guidance for acquisition programs on how to incorporate tailored weapon systems cybersecurity requirements, acceptance criteria, and verification processes into contracts.”

Overall, DoD acquisition programs developed new policies and guidance documents to improve weapons systems’ cybersecurity, the GAO found. However, some programs didn’t clearly define cybersecurity activities that would lead to acceptance or rejection of the system. Some didn’t outline how the department would verify cybersecurity requirements.

Officials interviewed by the GAO said that “effectively” contracting for cybersecurity is a challenge for acquisition programs. One senior DOD official told the watchdog that “standardizing cybersecurity requirements is difficult and the department needs to better communicate cybersecurity requirements and systems engineering to the users that will decide whether or not a cybersecurity risk is acceptable.”

Another official said the “lack of clear performance criteria for cybersecurity requirements creates challenges for understanding and implementing better security.”

The Defense Department agreed with the GAO’s recommendation for the Army and Navy, while partially concurring with the idea for the Marine Corps, stating that the Marines and Navy should merge their efforts because they operate under the same acquisition structure.

“Ultimately, DOD’s success in improving weapon systems cybersecurity depends on the extent to which the military services and acquisition community execute these changes to produce better outcomes in their programs,” the GAO wrote.

In one effort to improve weapons’ cyber safeguards, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Pentagon’s Silicon Valley arm, is developing a system with cybersecurity company ForAllSecure to continuously probe platforms for vulnerabilities. The company started working on its testing platform, called Mayhem, after the 2018 GAO report.

Photo: The destroyer Dewey conducts a tomahawk missile flight test in the western Pacific. A congressional watchdog called for better cybersecurity requirements in contracts for such weapon systems. (MC2 Devin Langer/U.S. Navy)

Link: Pentagon struggles to add cybersecurity to weapon contracts, watchdog finds (c4isrnet.com)

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