Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

ASCF News

Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

Chinese Exports to Russia Decline After Invasion of Ukraine

Wednesday, April 13, 2022

Categories: ASCF News Economic Security

Comments: 0

Source: https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinese-exports-to-russia-decline-after-invasion-of-ukraine_4401194.html

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China’s exports to Russia declined in March, official data showed on April 13, in a sign that Chinese companies may be displaying more caution when it comes to trading with Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine in February.

Data shows that Chinese firms sold $3.8 billion worth of goods to Russia in March 2022, representing a 7.7 percent decline from a year earlier and the lowest amount since May 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic, which drastically impacted global trade.

Meanwhile, imports from Russia increased 26.4 percent from a year ago.

While data regarding which goods were imported will be available later in the month, China typically purchases oil, natural gas, coal, and agricultural products from Russia.

In return, China sells Russia electronic equipment, transportation equipment, machinery, mobile phones, cars, and other consumer products.

Typically, the country buys more from Russia than it sells to Russia.

In March, China received 188,000 tons of liquefied natural gas—used to generate electricity and heat— from Russia, down from 273,000 tons a year earlier, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

While China has been steadily increasing its gas imports from Russia since 2019, when Moscow began sending gas to the country via its Gazprom-operated Power of Siberia pipeline, that amount is still less than 11 percent of what China imported from its top supplier, Australia, in March, Bloomberg reported.

However, those gas imports may have slowed down due to various issues in March such as pipeline maintenance and the recent outbreak of COVID-19 in the country, which has resulted in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) utilizing an excessive “zero Covid” strategy and enforcing lockdowns and tighter controls at ports of entry.

Shanghai reported 26,330 confirmed COVID-19 infections on April 13, a new daily record.

Yet analysts at Bloomberg believe imports of gas from Russia could rise by 3 billion cubic meters this summer, from 10 billion cubic meters in 2021, in an effort to keep up with the existing supply contract between the two nations. Gazprom is contracted to deliver up to 38 billion cubic meters of gas a year by 2025.

Data released in January from the CCP’s General Administration of Customs shows that overall in 2021, China’s total trade with Russia grew 36 percent to $147 billion.

Beijing has criticized trade and financial sanctions imposed on Moscow by the United States, Europe, and Japan over its invasion of Ukraine, and earlier this month the CCP joined India, which also maintains close relations with Moscow, in abstaining from a vote on the United Nations resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanding that it immediately end its military operations in the country.

In February, Chinese leader Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and they laid out a plan to increase their bilateral trade to the equivalent of $250 billion by 2024, up from $140 billion in 2021.

However, the latest data appears to indicate that Chinese companies may be showing skepticism regarding trade with Moscow and are choosing to abide by Western sanctions levied against the country in an effort to safeguard against possible losses in dealings with Russia.

The latest trading figures come as Russia’s economy is on track to contract by more than 10 percent in 2022, marking the biggest fall in gross domestic product since the years following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, former finance minister Alexei Kudrin said on April 12.

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