Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

ASCF News

Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

CCP’s Grand Strategy Is to Displace US: China Expert

Monday, August 30, 2021

Categories: ASCF News Emerging Threats

Comments: 0

Source: https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-has-a-grand-strategy-to-displace-us-china-expert_3969974.html

Chinese military vehicles, carrying DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles, drive past Tiananmen Square during a military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3, 2015. (Andy Wong/Pool/Getty Images)

China has had three grand strategies to counter the United States since 1989, culminating in the latest phase, beginning in 2016, of wanting to displace the United States, China expert Rush Doshi said during an Aug. 26 webinar to talk about his new book.

Doshi wrote the book “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order” while working at the Brookings Institution, which hosted the online event. Now he’s the Biden administration’s newly appointed director for China on the White House National Security Council.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials “seek to restore China to its due place and roll back the historical aberration of the West’s overwhelming global influence” with its grand strategy, according to Doshi’s book.

The grand strategy is now in its third phase, he said, after he examined years of CCP documents such as memoirs, speeches, and biographies. Today China sees its competition with the United States as global, regional, and functional in many domains, according to Doshi.

“It’s in key domains like economics, technology, finance, emerging technologies, obviously in security and political institutions,” Doshi said.

He noted that the nature of the Sino–U.S. competition has been much wider in current times, involving more countries.

“If you look at the Chinese discourse on what they see as the future of competition … they believe that the West, the United States and others, will sort of increasingly work together,” Doshi said.

“They think they have to do the same thing with other states. That’s a little harder, in their own estimation, because they don’t have the same network of alliances and historical partnerships.”

His comments were made in his personal capacity as a former Brookings fellow.

The first phase of China’s grand strategy lasted from 1989 until 2008, then the second phase was in effect for the next eight years, according to Doshi. In 2016, China commenced its third phase of the strategy.

According to Doshi, Beijing saw the United States as a quasi-ally before it changed its perception and viewed America as an ideological and military threat following three events—the Tiananmen Square massacre, the first Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Describing the events as a “traumatic trifecta,” he said Beijing ushered in the first phrase—a blunting strategy.

His book details how China made military, political, and economic decisions in accordance with the blunting strategy. For example, Beijing shifted from controlling distant maritime territory to preventing the U.S. Navy’s ability to traverse or intervene in waters near China. The shift was accompanied by focusing its military investment in submarines, naval mine arsenal, and anti-ship ballistic missiles.

The 2008 financial crisis prompted Beijing to see the United States differently, believing it was “weakening” and that its economic and political model wasn’t “quite as effective,” Doshi said during the webinar. In response to its new view, Beijing began focusing more on “building the foundations for Chinese order within Asia.”

He said the shift from blunting to building was evident by a speech by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao at the 2009 ambassadorial conference, during which he said China had to “actively accomplish something.”

As a result, Beijing began to focus more on distant military capabilities, turning its attention to investing in aircraft carriers, overseas military bases, and surface vessels, according to Doshi’s book.

Beijing reaffirmed its belief that the United States, as well as the West, was in decline, after seeing populist candidates win several elections around the world in 2016, former President Donald Trump’s presidential victory, and the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, according to Doshi. In response to its assessment, the Chinese regime adopted the third phase of its grand strategy—what he called an expansion strategy.

The communist regime “takes the blunting and building strategies from early periods and applies them on a global stage,” he said.

“If there are two paths to hegemony—a regional one and a global one—China is now pursuing both,” his book reads.

“It is clear, then, that China is the most significant competitor that the United States has faced and that the way Washington handles its emergence to superpower status will shape the course of the next century.”

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