Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

ASCF News

Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

Blue State Blues: No Alternative to Peace Talks Between Russia and Ukraine

Friday, March 18, 2022

Categories: ASCF News Emerging Threats

Comments: 0

Source: https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/03/18/blue-state-blues-no-alternative-to-peace-talks-between-russia-and-ukraine/

Ian Langsdon / Pool / AFP / Getty

There is no alternative to peace talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, despite the impassioned pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Congress on Wednesday, and calls by sympathetic politicians for MiGs or a no-fly zone.

The Ukrainians have fought valiantly under their leader, who defied suggestions by the Biden Administration that he flee the capital city of Kyiv in the early stages of the war, when the U.S. expected Ukraine to fold under the Russian onslaught.

Barring a sudden breakthrough, Russia will not overrun Ukraine, nor will it hoist its flag over Kyiv, which was a primary, if unstated, objective at the start of the invasion last month. Ukrainian cities are proving ungovernable even where Russia has occupied them.

The Russians still have the weaponry to flatten Kyiv, and of course have nuclear weapons as well. But at this point, Russian President Vladimir Putin has to know that using those measures could mean permanently cutting off the Russian economy from the world, and perhaps drawing NATO into the conflict.

NATO is already unofficially involved, of course, sending advanced weapons into Ukraine that have had a devastating impact on Russian armor and air support. But there is not much more the alliance can do without triggering a wider war. As Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) pointed out on Fox News on Wednesday evening, the only way a no-fly zone can be enforced is to attack Russian air defenses in Belarus and in Russia itself, which would almost certainly provoke a retaliatory response.

Nor is there an easy way around the dilemma that supplying Polish fighter jets would create. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, though often a font of disinformation and condescension, was essentially correct in distinguishing between these aircraft as “offensive” weapons, versus the “defensive” anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles NATO is supplying. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) told Fox News’ Jesse Waters that the MiGs would help trigger an internal revolt in Russia. Wishful thinking.

(It is, by the way, extraordinary to see the media clamor for military action. The White House press corps has been pushing Biden to supply the Polish MiGs, without any apparent concern for the consequences. Virtually no one has asked questions about diplomacy. When President Donald Trump took out Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in 2020, the press panicked about impending war; the attack, in fact, made war less likely. The only difference appears to be the party of the president.)

The Ukrainians could mount a counteroffensive, one that cuts Russian supply lines and perhaps even threatens Russian targets behind the front lines. But doing so risks the incredible position that Ukrainians have won for themselves on the ground by provoking Putin to continue fighting, causing massive damage to the country. And losing Kyiv would remove Ukraine’s unexpected negotiating leverage.

The likeliest deal is not too different than what Russia demanded at the start of the war. Ukraine will probably agree not to join NATO; Russia will succeed in winning some kind of autonomy for the eastern provinces, though perhaps short of outright independence; and Russia will probably retain control of Crimea, even if Ukraine never formally recognizes Russian control there. Critics of the Ukrainian war effort, mostly on the right, have already asked what the point of resistance was.

But a deal would have been premature in the earlier stages of the war. Negotiations can only succeed when both sides believe talking is better than fighting. And even with Russian artillery pounding Ukrainian residential buildings, sending millions fleeing for their lives, Ukraine believed — reasonably — that it was better to fight than accept Russian terms, because its very sovereignty was at stake. Russia started this war in an effort to seize territory by force; resisting that was an existential duty.

Ukraine would love to see Russia simply retreat, agree to respect its boundaries, and to restore Crimea, which it took in 2014 with little resistance, exploiting Ukraine’s political crisis at the time. That is not going to happen. Ideally, Ukraine would also like to be free to join NATO; the war has boosted the value of membership. But Zelensky has realized that giving up NATO need not be a major concession if he can create some alternative new alliance, which he floated to Congress Wednesday.

So the best result is a deal. Russia could claim victory over the NATO issue; Ukraine could claim victory in defending its independence; and millions of refugees could return.

As usual, President Joe Biden is contributing nothing to this positive outcome. He gave a green light to Russian invasion, reversing President Donald Trump’s sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, granting Putin a Geneva summit before meeting Zelensky, and declaring invasion a fait accompli before it began.

Biden takes credit for uniting NATO, but it was Putin who did that, stunning the Germans into meeting NATO commitments that Trump had demanded they fulfill; had Germany listened to him, Russia might never have invaded Ukraine.

Now Biden is calling Putin a “war criminal,” which may be true, but gives Putin a reason to keep fighting. And despite the tough talk on Ukraine, the Biden Administration is quietly conceding to every Russian demand in the effort to salvage a new Iran deal.

The one thing Biden has done well — and which is supported by the American public — is keep the U.S. out of the war, at least formally. But had it not been for the courage of the Ukrainian president and the valor of the Ukrainian people, that decision would have been disastrous, and could have invited further Russian aggression, bringing NATO into the war regardless, and on unfavorable terms. Biden has not solved the perception of American weakness he created on taking office.

In chess terms, Biden chose to play with the black pieces from the start, meaning the best that NATO could do from the outset was play for a draw. He yielded the military initiative to Putin; moreover, despite claiming to be a champion of diplomacy, Biden sidelined U.S. diplomats with his bellicose rhetoric.

Israel’s Naftali Bennett, though often a weak leader, has carefully maintained his country’s official neutrality, and leads peace efforts. That remains the best, and only, hope.

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