An Imperfect but Durable Peace
May 2024—Our previous issue discussed the possibility of preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and freedom, even if Russia is not fully dislodged from the Ukrainian territories now occupied. This issue explores what’s happening—and what else needs to happen—to carry out that mission, should it become necessary.
Stepping Up
Several U.S. allies are stepping up with commitments that lay the groundwork for a secure and stable Ukraine. Indeed, some allies are ahead of the U.S. in preparing for postwar Ukraine.
“Determined to end forever Russia’s unprovoked attacks on Ukraine since 2014 and its full-scale invasion in 2022, which have brought great suffering to Ukraine’s people and threatened European and worldwide security,” Britain and Ukraine have signed a security cooperation agreement. Britain will provide Ukraine a range of deterrence-enhancing assistance, including: assistance for the protection and restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity; countermeasures against military escalation and/or new aggression by Russia; support for Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU; support for Ukraine’s NATO interoperability; security assistance and military equipment across the land, air, sea, space and cyber domains; support for air-defense capabilities; support toward development of a Ukrainian navy and coastal defense force; support for border fortification, surveillance and monitoring; and swift and sustained security assistance in the event of future Russian attacks.
In addition, Britain recently confirmed that it has “a small number of personnel…in country supporting the armed forces of Ukraine.”
Under a bilateral agreement signed in early February, Germany pledges “unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes in order to help Ukraine defend itself, restore its territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders [and] secure its free and democratic future.” Toward that end, Germany will: provide military support to the Ukrainian armed forces, “prioritizing air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, including ammunition and other key capabilities”; support military reforms in Ukraine “essential for its European and NATO aspirations”; promote “the interoperability of Ukrainian and NATO forces”; provide training; “contribute to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base, including through German industrial investments”; “mitigate existing supply chain bottlenecks impeding the development of capacity and capability of both Germany and Ukraine for manufacturing of priority weapons”; and “enhance cooperation in the field of intelligence.”
Declaring its “unwavering commitment to the strategic objective of a free, independent, democratic and sovereign Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders as of 1991,” France commits to “provide military and civil assistance to enable Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, its independence and its territorial integrity in the face of the aggression by the Russian Federation”; “deepen…cooperation in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence”; “provide Ukraine with swift and sustained security assistance [and] modern military equipment across all domains”; and enable Ukraine “to develop comprehensive military capabilities.”
In addition, French President Emmanuel Macron wants NATO to provide Ukraine “concrete and tangible security guarantees.” And General Thierry Burkhard, chief of France’s defense staff, has quietly broached the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops into Ukraine to enhance training and assist in de-mining. Other NATO members have expressed support for the idea.
Italy recently signed a security agreement with Ukraine vowing to “assist Ukraine with preservation of its qualitative defense and military edge”; “ensure security and defense forces of Ukraine are able to fully restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders”; “support Ukraine in defending its sovereignty”; provide Ukraine with “air defense, artillery, long-range firepower, armored vehicles, demining, reconnaissance means, unmanned systems, engineer means, information technologies, electronic warfare, air force and maritime capabilities and other key capabilities”; and “contribute to the development of Ukraine’s defense industrial base.”
Poland is finalizing a similar security deal with Ukraine. Taken together, these bilateral agreements—especially if the U.S. is added to the mix—could serve as a “bridge from Ukraine’s wartime trial to the long-term security of NATO membership,” as Ambassador Daniel Fried observes.
Japan, too, is in talks with Ukraine on a long-term security deal. In addition, Japan is already planning a postwar reconstruction and rebuilding program. The Japanese government convened an “economic growth and reconstruction” conference in February to line up industry support for what promises to be a herculean effort.
Western leaders could add momentum to Japan’s forward-looking plan—and offer hope to Ukraine—by tapping into $280 billion in frozen Russian assets. A portion of these resources could be used immediately to help Ukraine replenish its military stocks, and a portion could be set aside for postwar reconstruction. Germany’s recent decision to put the accrued interest on Russia’s frozen assets toward additional weapons is a step in the right direction, though the U.S., Britain and European Union continue to push for diverting all of those assets.
Groundwork
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg says the alliance is planning “to guarantee Ukraine’s security in the future—and break Russia’s cycle of aggression.”
It pays to recall that NATO offered—more accurately, dangled—membership to Ukraine in 2008. At that time, President Bush led a bloc within NATO pushing to bring Ukraine under the NATO umbrella. But France and Germany opposed that effort. And since NATO operates by consensus, Ukraine (along with Georgia) was left on the outside looking in. Some observers view that decision as a bullet dodged for NATO. But it was actually an opportunity missed—and a green light for Vladimir Putin.
There’s growing momentum within the alliance to correct that mistake. Ukraine’s entry into NATO is not a fantastical or faraway possibility. In fact, it seems Russia’s total war on Ukraine may have accelerated Ukraine’s entry into the alliance. “Ukraine will join NATO,” Stoltenberg declares. “It is not a question of if, but of when.”
More NATO members and more foreign policy thinkers are coming around to Ukraine joining NATO because they realize, finally, that Ukraine’s stability and security impact what the North Atlantic Treaty calls the “stability and…security of the North Atlantic area,” that Ukraine cannot be secure outside the NATO umbrella, and that NATO cannot be secure if Ukraine remains unsecured. Regardless of when Ukraine ultimately joins NATO, NATO members must be ready to ensure security inside and on the borders of postwar Ukraine.
NATO—and groupings within NATO—have carried out somewhat similar operations in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR) and the Middle East (MFO, which was discussed in the previous column). One aspect of the postwar situation in Ukraine that would be new for the alliance is the maritime dimension. Ukraine’s long-term health and security depend on the free flow of goods through the Black Sea. The good news is that “Ukraine has largely won the battle of the Black Sea,” as Vice Adm. Robert Murrett (U.S. Navy, retired) concludes, thanks to Ukraine’s effective and targeted use of seaborne drones against Russia’s navy. To keep the vital arteries of the Black Sea open for Ukrainian products—Ukraine accounts for 10 percent of global wheat supply and 15 percent of global corn supply—the U.S. and willing NATO allies must be ready to form a joint maritime taskforce. Because it would ensure delivery of grain and other goods, countries that rely on these goods—Philippines, Egypt, Morocco, Thailand, Indonesia, Tunisia—would likely join or support this humanitarian effort. For allies and partners concerned about the need for some sort of blessing from international law, Articles 11, 14, 51, 52 and 55 of the UN Charter check that box.
Finally, the U.S. could send a powerful signal—to Ukraine and Russia—by elevating Ukraine to the status of “major non-NATO ally.” Australia, Israel, Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan are among those so designated. As part of this designation, the U.S. could deliver a dependable supply of weapons to Kiev, stand up long-term joint military training programs with the Ukrainian armed forces, and develop systems and practices to move Ukraine toward NATO interoperability and full NATO membership. Importantly, such a program would mirror the efforts America’s closest allies are now undertaking.
No Reward
These initiatives—putting Ukraine on a faster track to NATO membership, arming and training Ukraine for long-term deterrence, bolstering Ukraine’s efforts to keep the Black Sea open, dusting off Cold War-era security models, diverting Russia’s assets to Ukraine’s recovery—could build a durable, albeit imperfect, peace and ensure that Putin is not rewarded for his aggression.
